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Dawson: Dawson on Eaglestone

Robert Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas.B
Reviewed by John David Dawson, Haverford College
Robert Eaglestone has discovered in the later writings of Emmanuel Levinas a postmodernist,
post-humanistic "ethics of reading" that escapes the weaknesses of competing approaches
represented by Martha Nussbaum and J. Hillis Miller. After describing the contemporary
discrediting of various modernist approaches to literary ethics based on literature's underlying
universal human values, as well as the failures of recent "anti-theorists" who have sought to
revive such unsophisticated humanism by "trying to grasp certainties that are no longer certain"
(p. 93), Eaglestone sets up the thesis and the antithesis out of which his Hegel-like discussion of
Levinas will generate an ethically satisfying Aufhebung. Nussbaum is presented as literary
humanism's most sophisticated contemporary advocate, but one who (having in effect failed to
take seriously enough her binary opposite, Hillis Miller) neglects the textuality of texts in favor
of their representations of ethically salient interactions of character and circumstance. Miller, on
the other hand, probes textuality for a textually immanent ethic, but ends up caught in an
unresolvable confusion between an insistence that "the ethical" is both fixed in language and yet
ontologically or linguistically indeterminate. With awkward terminology borrowed from Denis
Donoghue, Eaglestone calls Nussbaum an "epi-reader" who reads texts in order to hear an absent
person, and Miller a "graphi-reader" who ignores the world in favor of the text. At this apparent
impasse, "the thought of Emmanuel Levinas becomes relevant" (p. 5). Levinas's work can "be
seen as moving from epi-reading through to graphi-reading and then beyond the opposition of
the two." The result is "a new and different way of attending to the ethical in the textual, and of
the responsibility inherent in reading" (p. 7).
How does Levinas discover responsibility in reading, especially given his well-known "deepseated antipathy to art" (p. 98)? In Totality and Infinity, Levinas had discovered the ethical to lie
in one's face-to-face encounter with the presence of another person, not through the presence or
absence of representation. But Derrida, in "Violence and Metaphysics," showed that this
conception of ethics was unable to escape language, representation, and the metaphysics of
presence, despite all of its efforts to do so. Eaglestone argues that Levinas took to heart Derrida's
deconstructive reading of Totality and Infinity by executing a linguistic turn in Otherwise than
Being: "Levinas abandons his previous position which demanded 'true representation' and instead
offers a way of understanding ethics philosophically through representation, through the
phenomenon of language" (p. 135).
How, then, is ethics understood "through language"? The key lies in grasping the double nature
of language, its character as "amphibology." Language interweaves "the saying" (le dire) with
"the said" (le dit). All persons find themselves already within "the saying," in proximity to others
to whom they are already responsible. Responsibility is not an act of will by which one person
decides he or she is obligated to another; it is an a priori condition of ethical possibility, a site in
which one finds oneself already bound up with the other, unable to do anything other than
respond. Individual self-identity is subsequent to one's more primordial stance within the saying.
Like would-be biblical prophets proclaiming "Here I am" in response to a divine call, persons
find themselves immediately available and obliged to others as a function of their status
"beyond" or "otherwise than being."
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In contrast to the transcendent saying, "the said" is the realm of space and time in which the
saying is always "incarnated." But this incarnation does not manifest so much as it hides and
immobilizes: "The said has this hold because it designates, and, in designating, denies the
transcendence of the saying" (p. 145). "The saying, unthematisable, becomes trapped in the said"
(p. 146). Nonetheless, ethics requires the said, for the saying does not exist in pure form: ". . .
without the interweaving of the said and the saying there could be no ethics" (p. 149), though it
is the saying which is "the site of our responsibility for the other" (p. 144). The heart of the ethics
of reading, then, consists in the interruption of the said for the sake of releasing or manifesting
the saying. Although Eaglestone uses the term "transcendence" (ruling out any suggestion of
divinity) to designate the saying, the saying can also be characterized as any critical approach
that "interrupt[s] established understandings, the said." It turns out that it is the very "disruptive
power" of the saying that is ethical--the state of "not being at home, the strangeness of the
ineluctable call to responsibility" (p. 177), which is also, Eaglestone notes, a call to love. Put in
terms coined by Levinas, Nussbaum's plea to read in order to hone moral perception and
sensitivity "does not account for . . . the puncturing of the said, of the logocentric language of
ontology, by the saying" (p. 169). Conversely, in Miller's proposals "there is no other, no saying"
(p. 170). Sublating both these deficient efforts to move beyond modernist humanism is Levinas's
vision, in which "criticism, or literary interpretation, as interpretation and in many different
forms, is a 'witness' to the saying in the language of literature: this witnessing is its responsibility
and its duty" (p. 170).
Eaglestone is at his best when summarizing Levinas's later philosophy, especially when
articulating his self-contradictory remarks about the status of art and literature (despite a critique
of artistic representation, Levinas's own literary performance in Otherwise than Being suggests
that literature can provide the sort of interruption of the said required by any ethics of reading).
However, Levinas's own philosophy proves more gripping than Eaglestone's interpretative
remarks, mainly because those remarks are so heavily dependent on the simple, even reductive,
straw-man presentations of Nussbaum and Miller. At least in the case of Nussbaum, that
presentation seems excessively narrow and one-sided. There is too much of an assumption that
remarks by deconstructors about textuality simply trump Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian project.
The conclusion that Nussbaum doesn't care about textuality, or reduces the literary to the
philosophical, does not square with Nussbaum's richly textured description in The Fragility of
Goodness of the opposition of Greek dramatists to prevailing philosophical ideals. The treatment
of Miller seems equally quick and narrow, again designed primarily to provide an antithesis to
Nussbaum and a backdrop to the exposition of Levinas. I do not think the exposition of Levinas
really benefits all that much from the contextualization provided by Nussbaum and Miller,
though one could argue that juxtaposing Levinas to these two widely-read thinkers helps bring
him more directly into contemporary literary debates about the ethics of reading. Eaglestone's
wooden thesis-antithesis-synthesis approach (Nussbaum wants the world rather than texts; Miller
wants texts without the world; Levinas gets the world through the text) unfortunately draws
attention away from some of the nuance and insight of his exposition of Levinas.
Although Eaglestone occasionally draws attention to the religious, anti-theological, and
specifically Jewish features of Levinas's work, the relation (or lack of relation) between
Levinas's conception of ethics and his stance toward religion remains largely unexplored.
Likewise, the central category of the discussion--ethics or "the ethical"--is not so much defined

BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 1, Number 1 (Summer 1999)

https://repository.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/vol1/iss1/2

2

Dawson: Dawson on Eaglestone

as taken for granted, as though once one had mentioned terms like "transcendence" or
"responsibility" one had sufficiently accounted for "the ethical." Levinas's notion that one is
always already responsible to and for others is compelling but arises largely as a circular,
phenomenologically-grounded assertion: it will be compelling for those to whom it is
compelling. Finally, the occasional intrusion of the category of love in Levinas's text and
Eaglestone's summary also goes unanalyzed, as though it too were a self-evident phenomenon.
But what is the character of this love, what is its relation to responsibility, and how is a
responsibility generated by love different from one generated by other predispositions or
motives? Here one might return to Nussbaum, who writes about "love's knowledge" afforded
through reading attentively, to see whether she and Levinas might have more in common as
ethical thinkers than Eaglestone discerns.
In sum, Eaglestone's book is a welcome illustration of the pertinence of Levinas to current
debates about the ethical value of literature and reading. Levinas is a difficult writer, and
Eaglestone succeeds in explicating key Levinasian ideas about the saying and the said in ways
that will help literary critics and theorists build productive conceptual links between this
enormously stimulating thinker and other voices among those concerned with the ethical
dimension of reading.
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